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International Law in the Obama
Administration’s Pivot to Asia:
The China Seas Disputes, the
Trans-Pacific Partnership,
Rivalry with the PRC, and
Status Quo Legal Norms in U.S.
Foreign Policy
Jacques deLisle
The Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalance” to
Asia has shaped the Obama administration’s impact on
international law. The pivot or rebalance has been primarily
about regional security in East Asia (principally, the challenges
of coping with a rising and more assertive China—particularly
in the context of disputes over the South China Sea—and
resulting concerns among regional states), and secondarily about
U.S. economic relations with the region (including, as a
centerpiece, the Trans-Pacific Partnership). In both areas, the
Obama administration has made international law more
significant as an element of U.S. foreign policy and has sought
to present the U.S. as defending and promoting status quo
international legal norms, largely against challenges posed by
China. This approach has been somewhat more plausible on
security / South China Sea issues than on economic / TPP
issues. At the end of the Obama administration, significant
uncertainty looms about the prospects for this aspect of the
Obama-era approach international law and the international and
domestic conditions that helped to produce it.
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The Obama administration framed its “pivot” or “rebalance” to
Asia primarily in terms of geopolitics and foreign policy. Yet, the
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policy also has had significant international legal elements and
implications. The promise to rebalance the U.S.’s efforts and attention
toward Asia—implicitly, toward East Asia—may have fallen short of
expectations,1 but the pivot did push East Asia-related questions
much more toward the center of the U.S.’s practice of, and approach
to, international law. The Obama administration’s response to
disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in the South
China Sea (and the East China Sea), and its quest for the TransPacific Partnership as a “twenty-first century” trade agreement (and
a pact that reaches well beyond trade in regulating an increasingly
global economy) are primary legal aspects of the pivot or rebalance.
The U.S.’s “pivot” or “rebalance” toward East Asia (including
Southeast Asia) was also a shift away from a focus on another
geographic area: the Middle East (or West Asia, including Iraq) and
South Asia (more specifically, South-Central or Southwest Asia,
including Afghanistan and Pakistan). As is often the case, these
different parts of the world have presented different political and, in
turn, legal challenges for the United States. Thus, the pivot also
meant a shift in the subject matter focus of the U.S.’s practice and
agenda in international law. During the George W. Bush
administration, the defining issues in international law for the United
States centered on the fall-out of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan: the rights and obligations of states in combatting
terrorist organizations, the use of military force—with and without
UN Security Council authorization—to intervene in states that were
1.

See, e.g., MICHAEL GREEN ET AL., ASIA-PACIFIC REBALANCE 12025:
CAPABILITIES, PRESENCE, AND PARTNERSHIPS 195 (2016),
http://csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance20
25_Web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3HN-52QG] (finding “consistent
confusion about the rebalance strategy and concerns about its
implementation” among U.S. government agencies and U.S. allies and
partners in East Asia); Joshua Keating, Did the Obama Administration
Ever Actually Pivot to Asia?, SLATE BLOG (Apr. 21, 2014, 5:52 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/04/21/obama_s_asia_t
rip_did_the_administration_ever_actually_pivot_to_asia.html
[https://perma.cc/ND94-8RPG] (stating that, “despite all the talk of its
growing strategic importance, East Asia rarely seems to be the center of
attention in Washington”); Joshua Kurlantzick, Pivotal Moment,
DEMOCRACY (2016), available at
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/39/pivotal-moment/
[https://perma.cc/SXD3-RGMR] (describing the pivot as “badly
misguided” in focusing on states with little strategic value and
facilitating political regression in the region); Fareed Zakaria, Whatever
Happened to Obama’s Pivot to Asia?, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-forgotten-pivot-toasia/2015/04/16/529cc5b8-e477-11e4-905f-cc896d379a32_story.html
[https://perma.cc/237X-UEAT] (opining that, “[t]he Obama
administration needs to start believing in its own grand strategy….
Washington should focus its energies, attention and efforts on Asia”).
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found to support terrorism or harbor terrorists, the rules governing
treatment of combatants who were not members of the conventional
armed forces of states, targeted killings of individuals identified as
terrorists, the resort to “enhanced interrogation” or torture, and the
imposition of limits on civil liberties—some of which overlap
international human rights—under the proffered justification of
preventing terrorist acts and disrupting terrorist organizations.2
To be sure, many of these issues persisted into the Obama
presidency, and the Bush administration’s interactions with
international law were not confined to military intervention- and
terrorism-related issues. Although the contrast between the two
administrations, therefore, should not be overdrawn, the pivot-related
shift in the principal geographic and doctrinal concerns for the U.S. in
international law is striking. The two most high-profile legal
dimensions of the turn to (East) Asia under Obama have had
significant similarities and served interdependent policy goals. The
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) constitutes much of the economic
leg of the mostly security-focused pivot.3 The strategic pivot—
including especially the elements focused on the South and East
China Seas—undertakes to provide the security underpinnings for
open trade and economic ties in the region and beyond.
In both contexts—the TPP and related issues of international
economic law, and the China Seas disputes and associated issues of
maritime zones, sovereignty, and security-related international law—
the U.S. cast itself as the defender of status quo international legal
norms in the face of Chinese positions that have pressed or may
portend a revisionist agenda. The U.S.’s stances on both sets of legal
issues have been entwined with efforts to assure and engage other
regional states and to advance U.S. interests and aims. But the two
issue areas also differed in significant ways, including the clarity and
robustness of the legal status quo that the U.S. has purported to
defend, and the responses to U.S. moves by regional states living in
the shadow of frictions, and possibly sharpening rivalry, between the
U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
2.

See generally Marco Sassoli, The International Legal Framework for
Fighting Terrorists According to the Bush and Obama Administrations:
Same or Different, Corrector Incorrect?, 104 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC.
277 (2011); Michael Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force
in International Law, 79 INT’L L. STUD. 8 (2003) (discussing the Global
War on Terrorism and the use of force).

3.

See generally, KURT CAMPBELL & BRIAN ANDREWS, EXPLAINING THE US
‘PIVOT’ TO ASIA 3-5 (2013) (describing the TPP, strengthening existing
alliances in the region, and improving relations with emerging regional
powers as the three priorities of the pivot); MARK E. MANYIN ET AL.,
PIVOT TO THE PACIFIC? THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S REBALANCING
TOWARD ASIA 20 (2012) (“Economics and trade are both causes of and
instruments for the pivot toward the Asia-Pacific.”).
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I. The China Seas Disputes—Territorial Sovereignty,
Maritime Jurisdiction, and Regional Security
The Obama administration presented the “pivot”—later dubbed
the “rebalance” and sometimes described as a “return”—to Asia
primarily in terms of redefining U.S. priorities and reallocating U.S.
resources in ways that were more consistent with the U.S.’s national
interests, which were especially great in then-recently neglected but
strategically and economically vital East Asia.4 Underlying
Washington’s shift, and its welcome reception in much of the region,
was China’s rapid rise in power and China’s actions in pursuit of an
agenda that appeared, at best, uncertain and, at worst, assertive and
even aggressive.5 In terms of international security and perhaps more
generally, the biggest sources of concern about Beijing’s aims and
behavior were the disputes over territory and related rights in the
East China Sea (with Japan over the Senkaku / Diaoyu islands and
adjacent ocean zones) and in the South China Sea (with Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and others over various subsets of four groups
of islands and rocks, and rights in appurtenant maritime areas).6
The disputes between China and its neighbors were long-standing
and they produced significant discord which has led to sporadic
violent incidents since the 1970s. A relatively long period of relative
4.

See, e.g., Hillary Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, FP (Oct. 11,
2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/
[https://perma.cc/G75E-ZB5D] (“One of the most important tasks of
American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a
substantially increased investment — diplomatic, economic, strategic,
and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region.”); U.S. Dep’t State, Bureau
of Public Affairs, The East Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Expanding U.S.
Engagement (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/218988.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BGE-ZXMH] (“Recognizing that America’s future
prosperity and security are intertwined with the East Asia-Pacific
region, President Barack Obama made a strategic commitment to
rebalance our efforts and investments toward Asia.”).

5.

See generally, John J. Mearsheimer, Can China Rise Peacefully? NAT’L
INTEREST (Oct. 25, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/canchina-rise-peacefully-10204 [https://perma.cc/FL28-9GCZ]; Aaron L.
Friedberg, The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?
30 INT’L SECURITY 7 (2005) (addressing possibility of increasingly
conflictual relations between China and the United States).

6.

Michael D. Swaine & M. Taylor Fravel, China’s Assertive Behavior,
Part Two: The Maritime Periphery, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 8,
(2010), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM35MS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YF2L-4DFJ]; Alastair Iain Johnston, How New and
Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?, INT’L SECURITY 15-16 (2013),
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3704_pp007-048.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B56R-2N2B].
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calm came to an end near the beginning of Obama’s presidency, and
recurrent tensions and occasional crises have roiled regional relations
since then.7 With China adopting stronger rhetoric, making bolder
legal claims, and moving to exercise greater physical control over the
contested areas, regional states—ranging from enduringly close formal
U.S. allies (such as Japan) to states that had not previously pursued
security ties with the United States (such as Vietnam), and others in
between (such as the Philippines and Singapore)—pursued or
welcomed support from Washington in the face of perceived Chinese
threats and challenges.8
Although the pivot was articulated largely in terms of
geostrategic considerations and somewhat in terms of values, it also
was cast in legal terms and conjoined with legal arguments. Those
legal arguments presented the United States as a champion of
established norms and valuable international public goods—including
regional stability and, in turn, prosperity.9 Often implicitly, at times
7.

See generally, M. TAYLOR FRAVEL, STRONG BORDERS, SECURE NATION:
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 267-99
(2008) (discussing China’s attempts to strengthen its claim to offshore
territory); ALLEN CARLSON, UNIFYING CHINA, INTEGRATING WITH THE
WORLD: SECURING CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE REFORM ERA 4991(2008) (contrasting China’s relatively accommodating stance on land
border disputes with its more assertive and uncompromising position on
maritime territorial disputes); ROBERT D. KAPLAN, ASIA’S CAULDRON:
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE END OF A STABLE PACIFIC 5-50 (2014)
(discussing China’s rising interest in and capacity to assert control over
the South China Sea and implications for friction and conflict in the
region).

8.

See generally, THE NEW US STRATEGY TOWARDS ASIA: ADAPTING TO
AMERICAN PIVOT (William T. Tow & Douglas Stuart, eds., 2015)
(providing an overview and examples of generally positive regional
reactions); ROBERT G. SUTTER ET AL., BALANCING ACTS: THE U.S.
REBALANCE AND ASIA-PACIFIC STABILITY 19-25 (Aug. 2013),
http://www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pd
f [http://perma.cc/KA6U-2AR3] (discussing the responses of Northeast
Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Asia-Pacific to the Obama
administration’s rebalancing of relations).
THE

9.

See, e.g., Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor, Press Release,
Remarks on The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013 (Mar. 11,
2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisorpresident-united-states-an [http://perma.cc/5688-M95J]( “[T]he U.S.
rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is also a response to the strong
demand signal from leaders and publics across the region for … sustained
attention to regional institutions and defense of international rules and
norms . . .. The United States is firmly opposed to coercion or the use of
force to advance territorial claims. Only peaceful, collaborative and
diplomatic efforts, consistent with international law, can bring about
lasting solutions that will serve the interests of all claimants and all
countries in this vital region.”); John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Remarks on
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explicitly, and sometimes in response to China’s stated opposition to
the U.S.’s role, the Obama administration depicted China as the
party that was violating or undermining existing international legal
norms.10 U.S. stances on international legal issues relevant to the
China Seas disputes are part of this pattern.
The U.S. has long insisted that it takes no official position on the
question of who has sovereignty over the landforms—and, thus, who
can claim the limited but valuable rights over adjacent waters and
continental shelves that a state with territorial sovereignty may enjoy
under the international law of the sea.11 In the South China Sea
context, Washington coupled this agnosticism on sovereignty with
sharp criticism of what the U.S. saw as crisis-risking unilateral
moves—predominantly by China—to disrupt the status quo, including
actual control.12 In the East China Sea setting, the U.S.’s position was
U.S.-China Relations (Nov. 4, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/11/233705.htm
[https://perma.cc/7QKG-5DUQ]) (describing “specific opportunities
that define the rebalance, goals” which include “reducing tensions and
promoting regional cooperation by strengthening the institutions and
reinforcing the norms that contribute to a rules-based, stable region.”);
Robert D. Kaplan, America’s Pacific Logic, STRATFOR (Apr. 4, 2012,
8:59 PM), https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/americas-pacific-logic
[http://perma.cc/A79B-QRNU] (“If American power was diminished,
China, India and other powers would be far more aggressive toward
each other than they are now, for they all benefit from the secure sea
lines of communication provided by the U. S. Navy and Air Force.”).
10.

See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks at the University of
Queensland (Nov. 15, 2014) (transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/remarkspresident-obama-university-queensland [http://perma.cc/CW47-A6GM])
(“[I]f, in fact, China is playing the role of a responsible actor that is
peaceful and prosperous and stable, that is good for this region, it’s
good for the world, it’s good for the United States…. [W]e are also
encouraging China to adhere to the same rules as other nations . .
.because America will continue to stand up for our interests and
principles . . ..”).

11.

See e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y State, Remarks With Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (Sept. 5, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197343.ht
m [https://perma.cc/T2BF-U4CM]) (Clinton, stating, “I reiterated, as I
have on many occasions, the United States does not take a position on
competing territorial claims.”).

12.

See, e.g., Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., Statement Before the Senate
Armed Service Committee on Maritime Security Strategy in the AsiaPacific Region 17 (Sept. 17, 2015) (transcript available at
http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/617677/statem
ent-before-the-senate-armed-service-committee-on-maritime-securitystrate.aspx [http://perma.cc/6XJC-MC5K] (stating that, “The United
States does not take sides on issues of sovereignty with respect to these
territorial disputes, but we do insist that all maritime claims be derived
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more complex and assertive. Although declining to take sides in the
sovereignty dispute between China and Japan, the U.S. affirmed and
reaffirmed—including in statements by President Obama and
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—its interpretation of the U.S.Japan security treaty as extending the U.S.’s commitments to defend
the existing arrangement of Japanese administrative control over the
Senkaku / Diaoyu.13 This posture added another international legal
dimension, inescapably casting the U.S.’s backing for Japan as an
interpretation of an internationally lawful mutual security treaty.
The U.S. standpoint on sovereignty provided a basis for rejecting
Beijing’s assertions that the U.S. should not attempt to
“internationalize” the “local” disputes in China’s near seas, or
“interfere” in a place where the U.S. had no territorial claims.14 It also
undergirded U.S. moves to convey support for Japan when Chinese
vessels and aircraft challenged Japan’s hitherto exclusive control over
from naturally-formed land features in accordance with customary
international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention” and
that “[i]f one country selectively ignores these rules for its own benefit,
others will undoubtedly follow, eroding the international legal system
and destabilizing regional security and the prosperity of all Pacific
states”); Prashanth Parameswaran, US Not “Neutral” in South China
Sea Disputes: Top US Diplomat, DIPLOMAT (July 22, 2015),
http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/us-not-neutral-in-south-china-seadisputes-top-us-diplomat/ [http://perma.cc/56J9-KYLU] (explaining
that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel “encouraged all
actors – not just China – to cease actions that run contrary to [resolving
disputes], including reclaiming land, building facilities and militarizing
features”); Kristina Wong, Defense Chief to Beijing: No ‘Militarization’
in the South China Sea, HILL (Mar. 1, 2016),
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/271372-carter-warns-china-againstmilitarizing-the-south-china-sea [https://perma.cc/DFQ8-DC49].
13.

Ankit Panda, Obama: Senkakus Covered Under US-Japan Security
Treaty, DIPLOMAT (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obama-senkakus-covered-under-usjapan-security-treaty/ [http://perma.cc/33XU-FMSG]; Q&A: Japan’s
Yomiuri Shimbun Interviews President Obama, WASH. POST (Apr. 23,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/qanda-japans-yomiurishimbun-interviews-president-obama/2014/04/23/d01bb5fc-cae3-11e395f7-7ecdde72d2ea_story.html [http://perma.cc/6V7V-8DB2]; Clinton:
Senkakus Subject to Security Pact, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 25, 2010),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/09/25/news/clinton-senkakussubject-to-security-pact/#.VrT3WzYrKRu [http://perma.cc/QUJ38Y2X].

14.

Zhang Yi, China Firmly Opposes “US Interference”, CHINA DAILY (June
1, 2015), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201506/01/content_20870993.htm [http://perma.cc/P3FE-PPD9]; Edward
Wong, Beijing Warns U.S. About South China Sea Disputes, N.Y.
TIMES (June 22, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23china.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/H4LB-G9QH].
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areas near the islands—ostensibly in response to the Japanese
government’s acquisition (derided in China as “nationalization”) of
land in the islands owned by private Japanese citizens. When China
acted, the U.S. sidestepped the sovereignty dispute and even-handedly
urged all parties to refrain from escalation and the use of force and to
obey international law, but left no doubt in Tokyo or Beijing about
Washington’s support for the status quo of Japanese control.15
The U.S.’s consistent eschewal of a position on territorial
sovereignty has been conjoined with other law-related positions.
Under Obama, the U.S. has called broadly on all parties to the South
and East China Sea disputes to observe international law, and has
emphasized support for two more specific and fundamental
international legal principles in the South and East China Sea
contexts: first, the rival claimants should handle their disputes
peacefully; and, second, nothing should impede the rights of free
passage of ships—including the U.S. navy—that the law of the sea
confers in the high seas, international straits, and waters under the
(limited) jurisdiction of coastal states.16 Here too, the legal face of
U.S. policy helped the U.S. to portray itself as the defender of status
quo norms and as legitimately asserting collective international
interests against a possible Chinese challenge. It perhaps served also
to undercut the possible force of a pair of Chinese arguments: that
China was itself adhering to international law (albeit under a different
and very controversial view of law’s content, as is discussed below);
15.

Justin McCurry & Tania Branigan, Obama Says US Will Defend Japan
in Island Dispute With China, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/obama-in-japanbacks-status-quo-in-island-dispute-with-china [http://perma.cc/U9F7ABBX]; Wu Xinbo, America Should Step Back From the East China
Sea Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/opinion/america-should-stepback-from-the-east-china-sea-dispute.html [http://perma.cc/67K2YWPF].

16.

Hillary Clinton, Sec’y State, Discussing U.S.-Vietnam relations, the
ASEAN Forum, and North Korea in Hanoi, Vietnam (July 23, 2010)
(transcript available at
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2010/07/201007231
64658su0.4912989.html#axzz3qT0pLkyY [http://perma.cc/6XQ3D7ET]); see also Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau E. Asian &
Pac. Affairs, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
(Feb. 5, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm
[https://perma.cc/A9JJ-PU4X]) (stating that U.S. taking “no position”
on claims to sovereignty over disputed land features coexists with U.S.
insistence that states forego “intimidation, coercion or force” and that
“maritime claims must accord with customary international law,” and
stating that “[i]n support of these principles…the United States
continues to oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and
lawful uses of the sea”).
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and that China had no intention of challenging the free transit of
ships “in accordance with international law” (while leaving troubling
ambiguity about whether China saw such restraint as legally
obligatory rather than discretionary, or as extending to certain
operations by U.S. military vessels that Beijing has often denounced
as unlawful).17
Moves by China and its antagonists—and interpretations of
Chinese behavior by U.S. observers18—helped the U.S. present its
positions as legally principled, while also offering U.S. friends and
allies in the region the strategic support that the Obama
administration’s pivot promised. Although characterizations of the
complex pattern of disputes in the South and East China Seas are
themselves subject to dispute, versions that have gained traction in
the U.S.—and that have been sharply rejected by China—depict
China as the more disruptive actor and challenger to the status quo.19
In these accounts, the principal moments of escalation in the conflict
between China and the Philippines include: Chinese state ships
stringing a net across the mouth of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 to
deny Filipino fishing boats access to the long-disputed area and
thereafter maintaining patrols to ward off Filipino ships;20 Chinese
17.

Wang Yi on the South China Sea Issue At the ASEAN Regional Forum,
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. CHINA (Aug. 6, 2015), available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1287277.shtml
[http://perma.cc/EPK6-D2Z6]; Sarah Chan, America Stirs Anti-China
Fears in South China Sea, WORLDMEETS.US (June 24, 2011),
http://worldmeets.us/globaltimes000069.shtml#axzz3zQ0MwMIK
[http://perma.cc/GFA3-6M8A]; China urges U.S. not to undermine
mutual trust, XINHUA (Jan. 30, 2016, 9:56 PM), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/30/c_135060127.htm
[https://perma.cc/7F94-LRUH].

18.

See generally Jacques deLisle, Troubled Waters: China’s Claims and the
South China Sea, 56 ORBIS 608 (2012) (discussing the South China Sea
and the grounds on which Beijing asserts rights to the disputed areas);
Peter Dutton, Three Disputes and Three Objectives China and South
China Sea, 64 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 42, 43-55 (2011) (providing a
detailed critique of China’s legal claims); James Kraska, The Nine
Ironies of the South China Sea Mess, DIPLOMAT (Sept. 17, 2015),
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-nine-ironies-of-the-south-china-seamess/ [http://perma.cc/MSV4-CJHT] (criticizing China’s legal claims as
unfounded and its behavior as crisis-provoking)).

19.

deLisle, supra note 18; M Taylor Fravel, China’s Island Strategy:
“Redefine the Status Quo”, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-thestatus-quo/ [http://perma.cc/SLW3-5VB4]; Kraska, supra note 18
(stating that “China’s policies have created a dangerous mess in the
South China Sea”).

20.

Fravel, supra note 19; Jason Miks, China, Philippines in Standoff,
DIPLOMAT (Apr. 11, 2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/chinaphilippines-in-standoff/ [http://perma.cc/9UX5-739R].
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vessels’ harassment of efforts to resupply the handful of Filipino
servicemen stationed on the decrepit ship Sierra Madre grounded
atop a disputed reef;21 China’s refusal to engage in the international
arbitration proceeding—a venerable peaceful dispute resolution
process under international law—that the Philippines initiated in 2013
and pursued in a way that steers clear of the territorial sovereignty
and maritime boundary delimitation issues that are outside the scope
of the tribunal’s jurisdiction (partly because of the limited scope of
China’s submission to jurisdiction);22 and indications in early 2016
that China might be preparing to undertake large-scale landreclamation at Scarborough Shoal.23
For the East China Sea, prominent assessments in the U.S. view
China as having engaged in retaliatory escalation against Japan in
2012 when it dispatched naval ships, state maritime service vessels,
and non-state fishing boats to the Senkaku / Diaoyu area after
Japanese Premier Noda’s government acquired the privately owned
land on the islands—a move that sought, according to accounts
sympathetic to Japan, to avoid conflict by preventing purchase, and
provocative use, of that land by ardent Japanese nationalists, led by

21.

Jeff Himmelman, A Game of Shark and Minnows, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-chinasea/ [http://perma.cc/G464-XLND]; Jane Perlez, Philippines and China
in Dispute Over Reef, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/world/asia/beijing-and-manila-indispute-over-reef.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/MLK3-KLNB].

22.

China Rejects Philippines’ Arbitral Request: FM, ENGLISH NEWS: CHINA
(Feb. 19, 2013, 8:01 PM),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-02/19/c_132178817.htm
[http://perma.cc/XXW7-B3G4]; China Rejects US Accusations of
Provoking the Philippines in Maritime Dispute, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST: ASIA (Apr. 1, 2014, 11:16 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1462316/us-accuses-beijingprovoking-philippines-south-china-sea-dispute?page=all
[http://perma.cc/PNY2-W53T]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s
Republic of China, Position Paper of the Government of the People’s
Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea
Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Dec. 7, 2014),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml
[https://perma.cc/R5U2-P778].

23.

David Brunnstrom and Andrea Shalal, EXCLUSIVE-U.S. sees new
Chinese activity around South China Sea shoal, REUTERS (Mar 18, 2016
3:42 AM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/southchinaseachina-scarborough-update-idUSL2N16Q08M [https://perma.cc/V7BHRPU5] (quoting U.S. Navy Chief of Operations Admiral John
Richardson, “I think we see some surface ship activity [by China near
Scarborough Shoal, which is] an area of concern…a next possible area of
reclamation.”).
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Tokyo Governor Ishihara.24 This narrative of an assertive and status
quo-threatening China was reinforced by Beijing’s subsequent
declaration, in November 2013, of an unusually restrictive air defense
identification zone (ADIZ) over much of the East China Sea,
including over the Senkaku islands.25
So too, when China, in 2014, temporarily deployed a massive oil
exploration rig in waters near Vietnam’s coast and small landforms
claimed by China, and used water cannons to repel Vietnamese ships,
the storyline that took hold in the U.S. portrayed China as the
disturber of the status quo.26 The same pattern recurred, in a much
24.

INT’L CRISIS GROUP, DANGEROUS WATERS: CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS ON
THE ROCKS 12-15, 23 (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/245dangerous-waters-china-japan-relations-on-the-rocks.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VN87-RVPV] (characterizing China’s approach as
“reactive assertiveness” and describing China’s “incremental escalation”
of the island dispute); Scott Cheney-Peters, How Japan’s
Nationalization Move in the East China Sea Shaped the U.S. Rebalance,
NAT’L INTEREST (Oct. 26, 2014),
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-japans-nationalization-movethe-east-china-sea-shaped-11549?page=show [http://perma.cc/J849W3BX] (describing “Chinese decision to confront Japan” over Japan’s
decision to “nationalize” land in the islands as having “perhaps done
more to shape the rebalance and the success of its implementation than
any other actions”).

25.

China Exclusive: Defense Ministry spokesman responds to air defense
identification zone questions, XINHUA (Nov. 23, 2013), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132912145.htm
[https://perma.cc/D3YS-TGDG]; Jun Osawa, China’s ADIZ Over the
East China Sea: A “Great Wall in the Sky”?, BROOKINGS (Dec. 17,
2013), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-airdefense-identification-zone-osawa [http://perma.cc/2YRN-UDZ7].

26.

Jen Psaki, State Dep’t Spokesperson, Press Statement on
Vietnam/China: Chinese Oil Rig Operations Near the Paracel Islands
(May 7, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225750.htm
[https://perma.cc/JG3C-Y548]) (characterizing oil rig deployment as
“provocative” and “part of a broader pattern of Chinese behavior…that
undermines peace and stability,” and calling on all parties to address
their claims “peacefully and in accordance with international law”);
Ankit Panda, China’s HD-981 Oil Rig Returns, Near Disputed South
China Sea Waters, DIPLOMAT (June 27, 2015),
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/chinas-hd-981-oil-rig-returns-todisputed-south-china-sea-waters/ [http://perma.cc/6CK2-HCCR]; China
and Vietnam Clash Over Oil Rig in South China Sea as Tensions
Escalate, WASH. POST (May 7, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-andvietnam-clash-over-oil-rig-in-south-china-sea-as-tensionsescalate/2014/05/07/b936ed42-d5f7-11e3-95d3-3bcd77cd4e11_story.html
[http://perma.cc/KV9N-ZHEF].
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stronger form after China began, in 2014, to undertake massive land
reclamation projects at seven landforms and maritime features China
controls in the South China Sea. U.S. government statements and
Western media coverage have been highly critical of China’s actions
and have had little patience with Beijing’s arguments that other
claimant states had on other occasions undertaken land reclamation
(although not recently or on so massive a scale), or that the purposes
of China’s island-building were limited to providing bases for
maritime rescue, protection for fishing fleets, and other such benign
purposes.27
Official statements from the Obama administration and inferences
from Washington’s support for China’s rivals have entailed or implied
the U.S.’s rejection of several specific Chinese claims that have been
inconsistent with legal rules governing maritime rights and related
security interests or, at least, interpretations of those rules that are
widely shared internationally and are strongly backed by the United
States. Although the U.S. has long called on China to clarify the
nature of the claim associated with its famous “9-dash line” enclosing
the vast bulk of the South China Sea, the issue sharpened during the
Obama years.28 China placed renewed emphasis on the 9-dash line—
27.

Edward Wong & Jonathan Ansfield, To Bolster Its Claims, China
Plants Islands in Disputed Waters, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/world/asia/spratly-archipelagochina-trying-to-bolster-its-claims-plants-islands-in-disputed-waters.html
[http://perma.cc/T3QQ-NFH6]; Daniel Russel, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau
E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, U.S. Priorities in East Asia and the Pacific
(Sep. 26, 2014) (transcript available at http://fpc.state.gov/232135.htm
[https://perma.cc/WCK9-M957]) (stating U.S.’s emphasis on
“importance of asserting and making and clarifying territorial claims in
a way that’s fully consistent with accepted international law” and
noting that “the scale, scope and pace of China’s reclamation work
vastly exceeds that of others and is the source of clear anxiety and
instability” in the region); Elizabeth Shim, Ashton Carter: Beijing
Should End Activities in South China Sea, UPI (Sept. 16, 2015, 1:39
PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/WorldNews/2015/09/16/Ashton-Carter-Beijing-should-end-activities-in-SouthChina-Sea/7451442423816/ [http://perma.cc/UAG5-HXLX]; President
Obama & President Xi of China, Remarks at a Joint Press Conference
(Sept. 25, 2015, 12:22 PM) (transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarkspresident-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint
[http://perma.cc/58ER-WC6U]) (showing that Obama “conveyed . . .
significant concerns over land reclamation, construction and the
militarization of disputed areas.”).

28.

U.S. Department of State Seeks to Clarify Meaning of China’s 9-Dash
Line, GEOGARAGE BLOG (Feb. 22, 2016), available at
http://blog.geogarage.com/2016/02/us-department-of-state-seeks-toclarify.html [https://perma.cc/4SPM-T2T2] (“Washington has often
called on Beijing to clarify her claims on the South China Sea, in an
attempt to constrain them while avoiding a frontal clash”); Scott
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especially in the context of China’s opposition to claims filed by
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam with the United Nations
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf—the international
body that addresses delimitation of overlapping continental shelf
zones.29
When the Obama administration included free international
passage through the South China Sea among the U.S.’s three
principal policies on the South China Sea, it implied a challenge to
the legal validity of the strongest readings of China’s frustratingly
ambiguous 9-dash line claim.30 The U.S. position was partly rooted in
the view that China had no plausible legal claim that all the waters
within the line were Chinese sovereign waters, akin to a territorial
sea, or that the vast majority of those waters was part of a territorial
sea ostensibly derived from baselines that—by the standards of U.S.
and mainstream international views of relevant law—China had
drawn too expansively around landforms that were too scattered, too
small, and too unsettled in ownership to support such claims.31
Marciel, Deputy Assistant Sec’y State, Statement Before the Senate
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs (July 15, 2009)
(transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/07/126076.htm
[https://perma.cc/G2DH-RMQS]); Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant
Sec’y Defense, Statement Before the Senate Subcommittee on East
Asian and Pacific Affairs 9,11 (July 15, 2009) (transcript available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg53022/pdf/CHRG111shrg53022.pdf [https://perma.cc/56U6-TWGB]).
29.

See People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale to the Secretary General
of the United Nations with regard to the joint submission made by
Malaysia and Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, CML/17/2009 (May 7, 2009); see also People’s
Republic of China, Note Verbale to the Secretary General of the United
Nations with regard to the Philippines’ Note Verbale, No. 000228,
CML/8/2011/ (Apr. 14, 2011); Gabriel Dominguez, China’s NineDashed Line Has ‘No Basis Under International Law,’ DW (July 27,
2015), http://www.dw.com/en/chinas-nine-dashed-line-has-no-basisunder-international-law/a-18609290 [http://perma.cc/BB4N-3PS8]
(describing Philippines arbitration claim and explaining that, “Vietnam,
Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also challenge Chinese claims over most of
the resource-rich sea.”).

30.

Jeffrey A. Bader, The U.S. and China’s Nine-Dash Line: Ending the
Ambiguity, BROOKINGS (Feb. 6, 2014), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-china-ninedash-line-bader [http://perma.cc/XJA4-PT4U]; Daniel R. Russel,
Assistant Sec’y, Bureau E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, Testimony before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific (Feb. 5, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm
[http://perma.cc/7CB4-56Z5]).

31.

See Office Ocean & Polar Affairs et al., China: Maritime Claims in the
South China Sea, LIMITS IN SEAS Dec. 5, 2014, at 14-15,
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Another of the U.S.’s core policy positions—that disputants
(especially including China) must adhere to international law—swept
somewhat more broadly and, again, cast China’s positions as at odds
with established legal norms. This policy, too, implied rejection of the
“sovereign waters” claim that China had never definitively repudiated
despite repeated U.S. calls. It also entailed a rebuff of the less
radical—but still revisionist—and more recently emerging Chinese line
of argument that the PRC has “historic rights” or “historic title” over
the waters that are rooted in customary international law and that
survived the advent of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS)-centered regime and the contemporary customary
international law embodied in UNCLOS’s substantive provisions.32
Amid growing friction over the maritime disputes between
Washington and Beijing in late 2014, the U.S. State Department’s
authoritative Limits in the Seas series issued an elaborate analysis
that rejected the 9-dash line, including China’s “historic” claims the
area, as unsustainable under international legal rules governing
maritime zones.33
The Obama administration’s calls for freedom of navigation (and
overflight) and adherence to international law framed other Chinese
legal arguments and actions as at odds with existing principles of
international law, specifically those concerning the limits of coastal
states’ rights to regulate activities in their exclusive economic zones
(EEZ) or on the high seas. The U.S. rejected China’s objections that
U.S. practices of sending naval vessels and aircraft into areas near
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UHW6-4DVQ] (rejecting Chinese claim to the waters
in the 9-dash line as inconsistent with international law); Office Ocean
& Polar Affairs et al., Straight Baselines Claim: China, LIMITS IN SEAS,
July 9, 1996, at 4-8,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57692.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84SF-NC67] (rejecting China’s straight baseline
claims in South China Sea as inconsistent with international law); Sam
LaGrone, U.S. Destroyer Challenges More Chinese South China Sea
Claims in New Freedom of Navigation Operation, USNI NEWS (Jan. 30,
2016), https://news.usni.org/2016/01/30/u-s-destroyer-challenges-morechinese-south-china-sea-claims-in-new-freedom-of-navigation-operation
[https://perma.cc/7TLH-SHK7] (describing legal position underlying
U.S. navigation operation in area where U.S. views Chinese baseline
claims as excessive).
32.

See Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South
China Sea: History, Status, and Implications, 107AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 98,
99 (2013) (arguing that “historic title provides the basis for China’s
possession of certain historic rights in addition to the rights granted
under UNCLOS”).

33.

Office Ocean & Polar Affairs et al., China: Maritime Claims in the
South China Sea, supra note 31, at 15-22 (analyzing and rejecting 9dash line claim as “historic” claim under international law).
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Chinese-claimed landforms were, variously, unauthorized maritime
scientific research in China’s EEZ, infringement of security rights of
China in its EEZ, abuse of law-of-the-sea rights—including the
expansive rights that states enjoy on the high seas—by showing a lack
of due regard for China’s rights and interests, or non-peaceful uses of
the sea that threatened China’s sovereign autonomy or territorial
integrity or contravened other international legal limits.34 Instead, the
U.S.’s position—consistent with prevalent but contested (by China
and others) understandings of international legal norms—continued to
be that close-in surveillance and reconnaissance in China’s EEZ were
lawful acts, and that the U.S. Navy’s presence and activities in the
region did not violate international legal rules on peaceful use and
respect for other states’ rights.35
Many of these were long-standing points of disagreement that had
surfaced dramatically in pre-Obama-administration incidents such as
the collision of a Chinese air force jet with a U.S. Navy surveillance
plane off the Chinese coast in the early days of the George W. Bush
administration, and instances of Chinese navy ships harassing U.S.
surveillance vessels in China’s asserted EEZs.36 But, the Obama-era
34.

Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. REPORT, Dec. 22, 2015, at 5-6, 11-14,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf. [http://perma.cc/8V83EYMD] (describing Chinese positions and the challenges they pose for
U.S.); Yu Zhirong, Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. Navy’s Military
Surveys in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Coastal Countries, CHINA
MAR. STUDY, Dec. 2010, at 38-44, https://www.usnwc.edu/Research--Gaming/China-Maritime-StudiesInstitute/Publications/documents/China-Maritime-Study-7_MilitaryActivities-in-the-.pdf [http://perma.cc/B667-ULV7] (explaining and
supporting Chinese positions and China’s rejection of U.S. positions);
Peter Dutton, Introduction, CHINA MAR. STUDY, Dec. 2010, at 7-9,
https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-StudiesInstitute/Publications/documents/China-Maritime-Study-7_MilitaryActivities-in-the-.pdf [http://perma.cc/B667-ULV7] (describing
conflicting legal views of U.S. and China).

35.

O’Rourke, supra note 34, at 4, 29-32 (describing U.S. positions on legal
issues maritime claims, operational rights, and rights to freedom of
navigation in South China Sea); Dutton, supra note 34, at 7-10
(describing conflicting U.S. and Chinese legal views and relationship to
U.S. maritime strategy and patrol activities in the South China Sea).

36.

See generally Eric Donnelly, The United States-China EP-3 Incident:
Legality and Realpolitik, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC’Y 25 (2004); Spokesman
Zhu Bangzao Gives Full Account of Collision between U.S. and Chinese
Military Planes (Apr. 4, 2001), available at http://www.chinaun.ch/eng/premade/11437/spokesman040401.htm
[https://perma.cc/6ZUY-BEW6]; U.S. Plane Grossly Violated
International Law, CHINA.ORG.CN (Apr. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Apr/10074.htm
[https://perma.cc/AMV3-DYY].
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pivot was accompanied by a reaffirmation of familiar positions and a
new emphasis on these issues, as well as high-profile confrontations by
Chinese vessels of U.S. Navy ships, including the USS John McCain
and the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and the Impeccable again in 2013.37
Initially framed by the perception that China was generally becoming
more assertive in the region, the Obama administration’s heightened
emphasis on freedom of navigation for the U.S. Navy—and others—
became more pointed in response to the specific issue of China’s
island-building project during the Obama presidency’s final years.
The land reclamation program prompted more close-in approaches
by U.S. ships and planes to counter China’s claims of dominion and,
in turn, stern warnings—based on inchoate and questionable claims of
legal rights—from Chinese forces to steer clear (including in an
instance famously recorded by a CNN news team on a fly-along on a
U.S. military plane).38 In October 2014, the U.S. Navy took a further
step, sending a destroyer within twelve nautical miles of the recently
augmented land forms, prompting a new round of Chinese official
statements that PRC naval ships warned the U.S. ship “according to
law” and claims that the U.S. was not acting in accordance with
international law, including obligations not to abuse rights to freedom
of navigation.39 In January 2016, the U.S. Navy elicited a similar
response form the PRC when it launched a “freedom of navigation
operation” within twelve nautical miles of the disputed, PRCcontrolled Paracel Islands—an area in which the U.S. has rejected
China’s straight baselines and related maritime claims as excessive

37.

See generally Raul Pedrozo, Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS
Impeccable Incident, 62 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLL. REV.101-11 (2009); Ji
Guoxing, The Legality of the Impeccable Incident, 5 CHINA SEC’Y 16-21
(2009); O’Rourke, supra note 34, at 12 (listing U.S.-China incidents at
sea in last several years).

38.

Jim Sciutto, Behind the Scenes: A Secret Navy Flight over China’s
Military Build-Up, CNN: POLITICS (May 26, 2015, 8:09 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/26/politics/south-china-sea-navysurveillance-plane-jim-sciutto/ [http://perma.cc/SV2G-6SRC]; Flight of
the Poseidon: New Navy Footage Released, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVE (May 21, 2015), available at http://amti.csis.org/flight-ofthe-poseidon-new-navy-footage-released/ [http://perma.cc/K5U2UAHC].

39.

Ben Blanchard & Andrea Shalal, Angry China Shadows U.S. Warship
Near Man-made Islands, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2015, 12:08 AM), available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/28/us-southchinasea-usaidUSKCN0SK2AC20151028#QKb4kSD1psavbd3W.97
[http://perma.cc/FMH3-AY5Y]; Jane Perlez, U.S. Admiral, in Beijing,
Defends Patrols in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/world/asia/south-china-sea-navypatrols-beijing.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/GRF5-RSWG].
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and inconsistent with international law.40 Implicit in the U.S.’s actions
and explicit in U.S. statements was an insistence that the U.S. was
exercising clear rights under established international law of the sea
and was resisting apparent Chinese efforts to undermine or rewrite
those rules.
When China declared its ADIZ over much of the East China Sea
after the confrontation that followed the Japanese government’s
acquisition of privately owned land in the Senkaku / Diaoyu, the U.S.
set forth its criticisms of China’s moves as a defense of status quo
legal norms.41 Compared to other U.S. critiques of the legality of
China’s actions in the maritime domain, this was a somewhat
awkward stance for the U.S., given the lack of a clear and solid
foundation for ADIZs in international law, and the U.S.’s having
pioneered the proclamation of ADIZs (and with Japan having
preceded China in declaring an East China Sea ADIZ). Nonetheless,
the Obama administration’s critique—and other U.S. analyses—
notably focused on how China claimed exceptionally broad rights to
regulate, and potentially to limit, the use of airspace by foreign
powers—claims of rights that the U.S. would not accept.42 The U.S.
therefore would not respect the notification requirements for U.S.
military aircraft that China claimed authority to impose.
The same dynamic threatened to recur, in a more accentuated
form, two years later when China responded to the U.S.’s and other
states’ pushback against Beijing’s island-building with public

40.

LaGrone, supra note 31; Full Statement of US Dept Defense on USS
Curtis Wilbur’s FONOP Past Triton Island (Jan. 31, 2016), available at
https://seasresearch.wordpress.com/2016/01/31/full-statement-of-usdept-defense-on-uss-curtis-wilburs-fonop-past-triton-island/
[https://perma.cc/WKD3-27NP]; China urges U.S. not to undermine
mutual trust, supra note 17.

41.

Chico Harlan, China Creates New Air Defense Zone in East China Sea
amid Dispute with Japan, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-creates-new-air-defensezone-in-east-china-sea-amid-dispute-with-japan/2013/11/23/c415f1a85416-11e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_story.html [https://perma.cc/9G4LVC9M].

42.

Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, U.S.
Policy in the East Asia and Pacific Region for 2014 (Feb. 4, 2014)
(transcript available at http://fpc.state.gov/220927.htm
[https://perma.cc/MB65-CLRQ]); Peter A. Dutton, Professor & Dir.,
China Mar. Studies Institute, Testimony before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee: Hearing on China’s Maritime Disputes in the East
and South China Seas 8 (Jan. 14, 2014) (transcript available at
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20140114/101612/HHRG113-AS28-Wstate-DuttonP-20140114.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUH3RR2U]).
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discussion of a possible Chinese ADIZ over the South China Sea.43
U.S. assessments tellingly and predictably warned that if China were
to proclaim an ADIZ over regions so remote from its own substantial
and undisputed territory, it would portend a more serious breach of—
and challenge to—international norms, including legal ones.44
Agreements on improved military contacts and incident-avoidance
reached during Xi Jinping’s September 2015 state visit and before
may have reduced the risks of accidental incidents and escalation, but
they did not close the gaps on these legal principles.45
As the foregoing indicates, while the Obama administration has
presented the U.S. as a supporter and defender of established
international legal norms when pursuing its strategic pivot to Asia,
China has rejected implications or accusations that it is flouting
international law. The PRC has insisted that its actions are supported
by law (for example, giving China “indisputable” sovereignty over all
of the contested landforms and related maritime rights, or “historic”
rights over contested waters, or rights to limit U.S. navy operations
43.

Mira Rapp-Hooper, China’s Short-Term Victory In the South China
Sea, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-21/chinas-shortterm-victory-south-china-sea [https://perma.cc/X3NN-4ST9].

44.

Admiral Scott H. Swift, Commander, U.S. Pac. Fleet, Statement as
delivered at the Royal Australian Navy Seapower Conference 5 (Oct. 6,
2015) (transcript available at http://www.cpf.navy.mil/leaders/scottswift/speeches/2015/10/ran-seapower-conference.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2V78-33ZH]); John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Remarks
with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (Feb. 23, 2016) (transcript
available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/02/253164.htm
[https://perma.cc/P8PD-B6US] (reiterating U.S. commitment to
freedom of overflight and stressing that enforcement of maritime claims
by deploying Chinese aircraft over disputed area are “not compatible”
with that freedom); Li Bao & Si Yang, Experts Worry China May Soon
Establish South China Sea ADIZ, VOICE AM. (July 29, 2015),
http://www.voanews.com/content/experts-concerned-china-may-soonestablish-southern-adiz/2882795.html [https://perma.cc/ZM5Y-G6DH].
See Roncevert Almond, Mandate of Heaven: An ADIZ in the South
China Sea, DIPLOMAT (July 20, 2015),
http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/mandate-of-heaven-an-adiz-in-thesouth-china-sea/ [https://perma.cc/QHM7-U96H] (“A state’s legal
ability to administer and use force to secure its sovereign territory and
accompanying airspace is much broader than the right to self-defense in
international airspace or within an ADIZ.”).

45.

See Mark J. Valencia, US-China Military Agreements Dodge Deep
Differences, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 10, 2015),
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/us-china-military-agreements-dodgedeep-differences/ [https://perma.cc/XV7L-C3K6] (stating, “[w]hether
these agreements will make such encounters ‘safer’ remains to be seen.
Meanwhile the root differences remain”).
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off China’s coast), or do not threaten interests that other states claim
as legal rights (such as open sea lanes of communications in the South
China Sea).46
International law on issues of territorial sovereignty, maritime
rights, and other matters implicated in the China Seas disputes is in
some respects ambiguous and potentially unstable. But, overall, the
U.S. has been able to benefit from and support its pursuit of the goals
associated with the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia by having
the better of the argument with China over whose positions are more
consistent with established rules and interpretations of international
law.
For China’s maritime neighbors and rival claimants to the South
and East China Sea areas, their interests have aligned with the U.S.’s
strategic pivot and the stance the U.S. has taken on key international
legal issues during the Obama administration. For those states and
for the wider region (including China), the U.S.’s security
commitments and the legal order that those commitments underpin
have long served as public goods.47 Crucial questions for the postpivot and post-Obama years are whether the U.S. will sustain the
capacity and the will to play its traditional roles in international
security and related legal regimes in East Asia, and whether a more
powerful China with more diverse and far-flung interests might
become more supportive of the status quo or more willing to become a
provider of international public goods in the region.

46.

China’s Indisputable Sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands,
FOREIGN MIN. CHINA (January 1980); The Issue of the South China Sea,
FOREIGN MIN. CHINA (June 2000); H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Sec’y-Gen.,
U.N., Remarks in New York (May 7, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_0
9/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CQG-2DGA]); see
generally THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE
(Stefan Talmon & Bing Bing Jia eds., 2014) (setting forth, in great
detail, pro-China positions; see Michael D. Swaine, Chinese Views and
Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,
CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Spring 2014, at 6 (explaining that
“authoritative Chinese sources have sought to provide further
clarifications on the nature and function of the ADIZ, emphasizing the
conventional and non-threatening nature of the Chinese zone”).

47.

Sheila Smith, The U.S.-Japan Alliance Upgrades and Maritime
Contention in Asia, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Apr. 30,
2015), available at http://amti.csis.org/the-u-s-japan-alliance-upgradesand-maritime-contention-in-asia/ [https://perma.cc/JP7B-DAK4];
James L. Schoff, Strengthening U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE (July 16, 2015), available at
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/16/strengthening-u.s.-alliancesin-northeast-asia/idhr [https://perma.cc/9WRK-V2FN]; see also sources
cited supra note 7.
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II. The Trans-Pacific Partnership—Integration and
Rivalry in the East Asian and Global Economy
Among the impetuses to the U.S.’s pursuit of the TPP was that
the TPP would serve as the economic leg of the Obama
administration’s pivot, or rebalance, to Asia.48 With its origins in
proposals that predated the Obama administration, and after
protracted negotiations that spanned the first several years of
Obama’s presidency, the TPP final agreement was reached by the
U.S. and eleven other states (including Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam)
on October 5, 2015 and signed by the U.S. on February 3, 2016.49 The
pact is massive; its charter members engage in one-third of world
trade and produce 40% of global GDP.50 It is also ambitious, with
provisions addressing traditional trade issues, international
investment, intellectual property, currency policy, and many aspects
of domestic economic regulation, including labor rights and
environmental protection.51 With its original and likely expanding
48.

Jeffrey A. Bader & David Dollar, Why the TPP is the Linchpin of the
Asia Rebalance, BROOKINGS (July 28, 2015, 8:00 AM), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/07/28tpp-linchpin-asia-rebalance-bader-dollar [https://perma.cc/D8RTHKXP]; Ankit Panda, Forging the Trans-Pacific Partnership: An
Insider’s Take, DIPLOMAT (June 10, 2015),
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/forging-the-trans-pacific-partnershipan-insiders-take/ [https://perma.cc/KL39-UY6F]; Mireya Solis, The
Geopolitical Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, BROOKINGS
(Mar. 13, 2015, 12:25 PM), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/03/13geopolitical-importance-transpacific-partnership
[https://perma.cc/JB9L-J2VG]; Bernard K. Gordon, The Trans-Pacific
Partnership and the Rise of China: What Japan Joining the TPP Means
for the Region, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov. 7, 2011),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2011-11-07/transpacific-partnership-and-rise-china [https://perma.cc/NH3U-4D3A].

49.

See President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the TransPacific Partnership (Oct. 5, 2015) (transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statementpresident-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/8C99-QG6R];
Statement by the President on the Signing of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 3, 2016), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/03/statementpresident-signing-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/USF36AMV]).

50.

Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, OFF. U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at https://ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-ofUS-objectives [https://perma.cc/CD7F-VYNV].

51.

See generally Peter A. Petri et al., The Trans-Pacific Partnership and
Asia-Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment, E.-WEST CTR.
WORKING PAPERS: ECON. SERIES, Oct. 24, 2011, 8-9, 14-21 (discussing
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membership in East Asia, the TPP promises to link the U.S. more
closely to major economies in the region and thereby strengthen the
U.S.’s economic presence and interests in the part of the world that
Obama-era policies have identified as singularly important to the
U.S.’s international interests, economic as well as geostrategic.
Along with earlier-established free-trade agreements with Korea
and Singapore, the TPP provides an economic dimension to
rebalancing that has offered reassurance to the U.S.’s allies and
partners and others in the region that Washington’s security
commitments are durable.52 Absent a robust economic component, the
more prominent security side of the pivot would risk looking like a
“sucker’s bet” for the U.S.—and one that regional states could not
count on the U.S. making over the long run. That is, the United
States would be bearing the considerable costs of underwriting
regional security, and it would be doing so with diminished resources
and perhaps weakened will in the post-Iraq War and post-Global
Financial Crisis era. Without the TPP and other arrangements to
bolster economic ties between the U.S. and regional states, China
would reap a more rapidly growing share of the economic benefits of
East Asian stability and integration as the increasingly preeminent
trade partner and fast-rising investment partner for most states in the
region. TPP-deepened and TPP-strengthened economic ties between
the U.S. and regional states promised to exert some counterforce to
China’s economic gravitational pull, and to bind the U.S. and East
Asian states to the mast in their commitments to one another by
giving them economic reasons to support the status quo in the region,
including the U.S. security commitments that, while offensive to
China, underpin that status quo.
As this suggests, the TPP, and the economic face of the pivot
more generally, also have responded to China’s rise as an economic
power. That rise has been accompanied—and aided and reflected—by
major regional trade agreement initiatives, including the ASEANChina Free Trade Agreement, the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (and numerous follow-on accords), the pursuit
of free trade agreements with Korea and Japan, and a Regional
Cooperative Economic Partnership (RCEP) that will include several

TPP objectives and providing an inventory of issues covered); JEFFREY
J. SCHOTT, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
11-40 (2013) (discussing the TPP scope, and negotiations and their
implications).
52.

Jane Perlez, U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on
China, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015) [hereinafter U.S. Allies],
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacificpartnership-china-australia.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9SZX-X3AM];
Solis, supra note 48.
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TPP members and rival the TPP in scale.53 China’s initiatives in the
2010s have gone beyond those centered on trade agreements. Beijing
increasingly has sought to take a leading role in establishing new
regional institutions with functions similar to those of the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development
Bank. Prominent among these are the Shanghai-based Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the BRICS-linked New
Development Bank (NDB), and an International Monetary Fund
(IMF)-like lending facility.54
In the TPP and related contexts, the Obama administration
framed its agenda partly in legal terms and sought to depict its
positions as supporting or fostering core legal—and broader—status
quo norms for the international economy.55 The TPP, after all, will be
a legally binding international agreement that sets forth legal rules,
many of which build on commitments member states have made in
earlier trade agreements concerning their domestic laws governing
foreign trade and investment. In pressing for the TPP, as with the
security dimension of the pivot, the Obama administration asserted or
implied contrasts between its generally status quo-supporting
approach and China’s agenda and behavior.
Yet, the Obama administration’s claim to be defending the legal
status quo has been on shakier ground with respect to the TPP and
East Asian regional economic institutions than in the context of the
issues related to international security in the South and East China
Seas. In the areas addressed by the TPP, the relevant international
legal norms and rules became unsettled before and during the Obama
administration, and some of the goals that U.S. policy pursued were
53.

See generally FTA News Release, CHINA FTA NETWORK,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/LR74CY8Z] (supplying news releases discussing various updates and details
regarding the trade agreements); Give Play to China’s Important Role
and Accelerate RCEP Negotiations, MINISTRY COM. CHINA (Sept. 1,
2014, 1:09 PM),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/20140
9/20140900720384.shtml [https://perma.cc/6NWC-PWPC] (providing
additional information about the trade agreements and the RCEP).

54.

The significance of these institutional developments is discussed in
greater detail later in this article.

55.

See, e.g., Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFF.
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 2015), available at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership
[https://perma.cc/GS84-VS7T] (summarizing content of TPP’s 30
chapters, covering a wide range of trade-related legal issues and
mandating conforming legal rules and characterizing the TPP as, in
part, “updating traditional approaches to areas covered by previous free
trade agreements”).
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not clearly or securely among the values or principles embedded in
existing laws and related institutions.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) became the centerpiece of
the international economic legal regime beginning in the early 1990s,
when it succeeded—and extended into areas well beyond trade in
manufactured goods—the original General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, which had been the most significant (although institutionally
weak) component of the postwar legal order for the international
economy. The WTO was not, however, a significant feature in the
Obama administration’s quest for the TPP. This was largely due to
the WTO’s stark decline, following the collapse of the Doha Round
negotiations, as the locus for liberalizing international trade, and the
WTO’s limitations in addressing many of the other international
economic issues—such as intellectual property rights, investment
regulation, and labor and environmental standards—that were on the
U.S.’s agenda for the TPP.56
From early in the TPP negotiating process, it was relatively clear
that the agreement would in some fundamental respects seek to
further the values and extend the rules that were already embodied in
the WTO and the WTO-centered regime for international economic
law.57 It is at least plausible to claim that this is the case with respect
to further liberalizing trade in manufactured goods and agricultural
products, enhancing market access, extending trade-facilitating rules
more deeply into service sectors and the digital economy, improving
transparency of trade-limiting rules and procedures, coordinating
competition laws, limiting non-market behavior by state enterprises,
reducing barriers to foreign investment (in part by adopting a
“negative list” approach that provides for openness except in sectors
specifically identified in host-country law), offering procedural
protections for foreign investors (including dispute settlement through
international arbitration) that should encourage international
investment, providing robust protection for intellectual property, and
restricting problematic domestic practices (including lax restrictions
on pollution or protection of workers’ rights) that can confer arguably

56.

Bryan Mercurio, The WTO and Its Institutional Impediments, 8 MELB.
J. INT’L. L. 198, 200-06 (2007); David Francis, The U.S.-Asia Trade
Deal Puts Dysfunction at the WTO on Full Display, FP: CABLE (Oct. 7,
2015, 1:59 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/the-u-s-asiatrade-deal-puts-dysfunction-at-the-wto-on-full-display/
[https://perma.cc/K66G-A9PS].

57.

Much of the specific content of the TPP had remained unknown until
late in the process because of the secrecy of the negotiating process and
repeated delays in reaching a final agreement. Nonetheless, numerous
leaks hand revealed many of the key elements early on, and the final
text largely confirmed expectations.
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unfair competitive advantages.58 Such features have underpinned the
Obama administration’s claim that the TPP is a “twenty-first
century” trade agreement and that the TPP would give the U.S. a
leading role in writing the rules for the international economy for the
century ahead, much as the U.S. had shaped the economic and legaleconomic regimes for the postwar world.59
But, as such forward-looking rhetoric implicitly concedes, writing
new rules—even rules that are generally consistent with the principles
or values embodied in existing rules—is not the same thing as
defending or supporting the status quo legal order. The TPP is in
tension with the WTO’s core “most favored nation” principle (of
equal treatment for all WTO member trading partners). In this
respect, however, the TPP does not depart from the status quo. The
WTO’s aspiration for universal rules has long given way to extensive
use—and not infrequent abuse—of provisions that allow preferential
trade agreements among groups of WTO members.60
Many of the TPP terms that have been most divisive
internationally and in the U.S. are controversial in part because they
depart from existing international economic legal rules, including ones
with roots in the WTO. For example, the Obama administration’s
drive for stronger protection for intellectual property rights has been a
distinctively (if not uniquely) American aim, resisted by other parties

58.

See generally, TPP Full Text, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text
[https://perma.cc/X42L-G28Z] (providing the provisions of the TPP in
full).

59.

Barack Obama, My Turn: Trans-Pacific Partnership is Better than Past
Trade Deals, POL. MONITOR (Oct. 17, 2015),
https://politics.concordmonitor.com/2015/10/opinion/my-turn-transpacific-partnership-is-better-than-past-trade-deals/ [perma.cc/6D9AM7PH]; Jeffrey Zients, Bringing Trade Agreements into the 21st
Century, WHITE HOUSE (APR. 16, 2015, 6:20 PM), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/04/16/bringing-tradeagreements-21st-century [https://perma.cc/Z6UT-EMLA]; Barack
Obama, Here’s the Deal: The Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
MEDIUM (Nov. 5, 2013), https://medium.com/the-trans-pacificpartnership/here-s-the-deal-the-text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership103adc324500#.klt37ir24 [https://perma.cc/NV9W-UZQF].

60.

See generally, Regionalism: Friends or Rivals?, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey1_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/5UK4-PNQU] (discussing the developments of the
regional trade groups); Sydney M. Cone, III, The Promotion of FreeTrade Areas Viewed in Terms of Moat-Favored-Nation Treatment and
“Imperial Preference”, 26 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 563, 563 (2005) (examining
the creation of free-trade areas and their “exceptions to the basic WTO
principle of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment”).
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and potential parties to trade agreements.61 So too, Obama
administration-supported TPP provisions—specifically, the InvestorState Dispute Settlement (ISDS) process—that would allow
international arbitral bodies to hear challenges to a state’s legal rules
have drawn fire from the left (for favoring multinational companies)
and from the left and right (for undermining American sovereignty by
subjecting U.S. laws to challenge in non-U.S. tribunals).62 Much the
same can be said about the long-incompletely-disclosed and highly
contentious sections concerning environmental63 and labor rights64
61.

See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime-Shifting: The TRIPS
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALE INT’L L. J. 1, 1-2, 23-25 (2004) (discussing growing
“[c]hallenges to existing methods of international intellectual property
lawmaking” and developing country concerns with U.S. and European
Community agendas); Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an
Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. R. 105, 109-18 (2012) (noting the
concerns raised regarding intellectual property provisions by the secrecy
of the TPP negotiating text and setting TPP against the back drop of
prior international opposition to U.S.-led efforts to expand intellectual
property protection under TRIPS).

62.

Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone
Should Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb, 25, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlementlanguage-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html [https://perma.cc/38TV-SU3C];
Celeste Drake, TPP Daily Debunk #1: The ‘Most Progressive Trade
Agreement Ever,’ AFL-CIO NOW (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Political-Action-Legislation/TPP-DailyDebunk-1-The-Most-Progressive-Trade-Agreement-Ever
[https://perma.cc/QVR5-X8CH]; Alan Morrison, Is the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Unconstitutional?, ATLANTIC (June 23, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/tpp-isdsconstitution/396389/ [https://perma.cc/TV9E-J976]; Daniel J. Ikenson,
A Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, CATO INSTITUTE (Mar. 4, 2014),
available at http://www.cato.org/publications/free-tradebulletin/compromise-advance-trade-agenda-purge-negotiations-investorstate, [https://perma.cc/4BRD-METM]; William Mauldin, DisputeResolution System Fuels Criticism of Pacific Trade Pact, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 2, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/disputeresolution-system-fuels-criticism-of-pacific-trade-pact-1425330853
[https://perma.cc/V88P-W2ND]; see also Sessions on TPP: ‘My Fears
Confirmed’; Shut Off Fast-Track Now, JEFF SESSIONS SENATE WEBPAGE
(Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.sessions.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsreleases?ID=711D14A5-8B65-4E4B-AAE1-7DCAA93EE60B
[https://perma.cc/U3HV-9D54](stating that the TPP “puts those who
make the rules out of reach of those who live under them, empowering
unelected regulators” from other countries).

63.

Michael Brune, Congress Should Oppose the TPP on Environmental
Grounds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015, 7:58 AM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/10/06/the-future-of-
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protection, with U.S. critics on the left worried that new international
legal rules will offer standards or enforcement mechanisms that are
too weak, and U.S. critics on the right concerned that the Obama
administration might use TPP commitments to increase regulatory
burdens and costs for U.S. industry. On both sides, the concern is not
about international legal stasis but about international legal change.
Along with this mix of status quo-supporting, norm-extending,
and rule-revising aims, the Obama administration’s pursuit of the
TPP, including its distinctly legal elements, has entailed rivalry with
China and has included efforts to portray China’s aims as in tension
with existing or evolving international legal norms.65 When the U.S.

trans-pacific-trade/congress-should-oppose-tpp-on-environmentalgrounds [https://perma.cc/3ZLV-Y9TD]; Brian Clark Howard, 4 Ways
Green Groups Say Trans-Pacific Partnership Will Hurt Environment,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 18, 2014),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/01/140117-trans-pacificpartnership-free-trade-environment-obama/ [https://perma.cc/BXU5KSP4]; Trans-Pacific Partnership Falls Short for Wildlife, DEFENDERS
OF WILDLIFE (Nov. 5, 2015), available at
https://www.defenders.org/press-release/trans-pacific-partnership-fallsshort-wildlife [https://perma.cc/2Q8L-PEYU]; The Trans-Pacific
Partnership Deserves a Hearing, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 20, 2015 4:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/417161/trans-pacificpartnership-deserves-hearing-editors [https://perma.cc/784U-H968]; The
United States and Environmental Protections in the TPP, TRADEWINDS
(Jan. 2014), available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/blog/2014/January/The-US-and-Environmental-Protections-inthe-TPP [https://perma.cc/H3BM-HPST].
64.

Trans-Pacific Partnership: Labor Rights, AFL-CIO, available at
http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Trade/Trans-Pacific-Partnership-FreeTrade-Agreement-TPP [https://perma.cc/76ZV-GZMH]; John Nichols,
Why So Many Democrats Rejected Obama’s Lobbying on the TransPacific Trade Deal, NATION (May 11, 2015),
http://www.thenation.com/article/why-so-many-democrats-rejectedobamas-lobbying-trans-pacific-trade-deal/ [https://perma.cc/6VXXZYS5]; United Auto Workers Leadership Statement of Opposition to the
TPP, UNITED AUTO WORKERS (Dec. 3, 2015), available at
http://uaw.org/united-auto-workers-leadership-statement-of-oppositionto-the-tpp-statement-from-uaw-president-williams/
[https://perma.cc/8UTJ-M223]; Daniel Horowitz, The Big Questions
about Trade Promotion Authority, CONSERVATIVE REV. (Apr. 23, 2015),
available at
https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2015/04/the-bigquestions-about-trade-promotion-authority [https://perma.cc/7MMS7ZTB].

65.

See, e.g., David Nakamura, Obama at APEC Summit: ‘China Must Play
by the Rules, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/obama-at-apec-summit-chinamust-play-by-the-rules/2011/11/12/gIQALRu2FN_story.html
[https://perma.cc/JQ24-T9CG] (explaining that President Obama
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began to pursue the TPP in earnest under Obama, PRC observers
characterized it—not without reason—as an “ABC” (“anyone but
China”) pact.66 In its drive for congressional support for the “fast
track” trade promotion authority (TPA) that long has been essential
for U.S. presidents to achieve trade agreements, the Obama
administration strikingly emphasized rivalry with China, specifically
in terms of assuring that the U.S., not China, will “write the rules”
for the Asian and global economies.67 Even with TPA and a freshly
completed TPP agreement in hand (but still facing opposition in
Congress in a future up-or-down vote on the pact), Obama reprised
this theme, declaring the TPP essential to avoiding an outcome in
which “competitors that don’t share our values, like China, will write
the rules for the global economy.”68 The President reiterated this

“warn[ed] China that it must ‘play by the rules’ as its international
influence increases”).
66.

See, e.g., Guoyu Song & Wen Jin Yuan, China’s Free Trade Agreement
Strategies, WASH. Q., Fall 2012, at 110 (explaining that, “most Chinese
scholars claim its successful implementation will have a negative impact
on China”); Mei Xinyu, TPP No Better than ‘Imperial Preference’,
CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12, 2015, 7:34 PM),
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/201510/12/content_22159826.htm [https://perma.cc/JQ24-T9CG] (“Be it
launching the negotiations on the TPP, or reaching agreement on the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe, all the
US’ moves have the intention of maintaining its hegemony in
international trade rulemaking while excluding China.”); Elizabeth
Shim, China’s Exclusion from Trans-Pacific Partnership Provokes
Reactions, UPI, (Oct. 6, 2015, 1:29 PM),
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/10/06/Chinasexclusion-from-Trans-Pacific-Partnership-provokesreactions/7151444150517/ [https://perma.cc/UT7W-8MUM] (“China’s
exclusion from the finalized Trans-Pacific Partnership has provoked a
range of responses from the world’s second-largest economy, and an
analyst said the deal is driven by political motivations to encircle
China.”).

67.

See Tanya Somander, President Obama: “Writing the Rules for 21st
Century Trade”, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 18, 2015, 3:01 PM), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/18/president-obama-writingrules-21st-century-trade [https://perma.cc/WA5C-T5CD] (“[W]e have
to make sure the United States -- and not countries like China -- is the
one writing this century’s rules for the world’s economy”); President
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union
Address (Jan. 20, 2015, 9:10 PM) (transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarkspresident-state-union-address-january-20-2015 [https://perma.cc/P3K6L4T9]) (“But as we speak, China wants to write the rules for the
world’s fastest-growing region”).

68.

Off. Press Sec’y, Weekly Address: Writing the Rules for a Global
Economy (Oct. 10, 2015) (transcript available at
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point, nearly verbatim, in his final State of the Union address and in
his statement on signing the TPP.69
The Obama administration often moderated its tone concerning
China and the TPP, declaring that the TPP was open to all who
could satisfy its relatively exacting standards—something that China
was far from achieving.70 China softened its position as well,
indicating that it was potentially interested in eventual accession.71
Even amid such less confrontational stances, however, the
international law-related point remained the same: the TPP was a
demanding treaty that was a qualitative step forward for established
international norms of trade liberalization, and that remained beyond
China’s capacity and will. U.S. official and mainstream sources
contrasted the TPP as a “high quality” trade-plus accord with the
China-centered RCEP, which limited itself more narrowly to trade
issues, imposed weaker overall obligations, and permitted greater
variance among the obligations of members. Such traits were familiar
from the much-criticized “spaghetti bowl” or “noodle bowl” of
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/10/weeklyaddress-writing-rules-global-economy [https://perma.cc/P3K6-L4T9]).
69.

President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address as Delivered (Jan.
13, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-%E2%80%93prepared-delivery-state-union-address [https://perma.cc/A7XU-BZWG])
(“With TPP, China does not set the rules in that region; we do. You
want to show our strength in this new century? Approve this
agreement.”); Statement on the TPP, supra note 49 (“TPP allows
America – and not countries like China – to write the rules of the road
in the 21st century, which is especially important in a region as dynamic
as the Asia-Pacific”).

70.

Kai Ryssdal, President Obama Says China Open to Joining Trade
Partnership—Transcript, MARKETPLACE (June 3, 2015, 9:53 AM),
available at http://www.marketplace.org/2015/06/03/world/presidentobama-talks-trade/president-obama-says-china-open-joining-tradepartnership [https://perma.cc/92A4-5YPN].

71.

China Communist Party Paper Says Country Should Join U.S.-led
Trade Pact, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2015, 11:08 PM), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-trade-tppidUSKCN0SJ01X20151025 [https://perma.cc/4CNT-JKFR]; China
Weighing up TPP, says commerce ministry, XINHUA (Feb. 4, 2016),
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/201602/04/c_135074386.htm [https://perma.cc/954Y-NEQH]; Keith
Bradisher, Once Concerned, China is Quiet about Trans-Pacific Trade
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/business/international/onceconcerned-china-is-quiet-about-trans-pacific-trade-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/LN5N-MDYM]; Barry Naughton et al., What Will the
TPP Mean for China?, CHINA FILE (Oct. 6, 2015), available at
http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-will-tpp-mean-china
[https://perma.cc/2XQR-BFEU].
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overlapping and diverse trade pacts that were prevalent in Southeast
Asia. 72
The Obama administration’s partly self-proclaimed competition
with China over the legal and law-related institutions of the
international economy, and its efforts to present the U.S. as
supporting established law or the further development of the legal
norms embodied in the existing order, extends beyond trade pacts.
The Obama administration, along with like-minded critics, cast the
AIIB and other new PRC-backed international institutions as
potential threats to venerable organs of the international economiclegal order, including the World Bank and the IMF.73 The Obama
administration strove, with strikingly little success, to dissuade U.S.
friends and allies from joining the AIIB.74 A rare exception to the
72.

Ben Rhodes, White House Deputy Nat’l Sec. Adviser Strategic
Commc’n, White House Briefing on President Obama’s Trip to Asia
Pacific (Nov. 23, 2011, 3:00 PM) (transcript available at
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/11/201111231
20030su0.9150769.html#axzz3zsjI8AnN [https://perma.cc/TK4G73A7]); Derek Scissors, What a Good Trans-Pacific Partnership Looks
Like, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2013), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/what-a-good-transpacific-partnership-looks-like [https://perma.cc/8CNX-GYA6]; Amb.
Alan Wm. Wolff on behalf of the National Foreign Trade Council,
Testimony before the International Trade Commission 8 (Jan 23, 2016)
(transcript available at
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/testimony/105_001_004
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGK9-GEXE]); Gordon G. Chang, TPP vs.
RCEP: America and China Battle for Control of Pacific Trade, NAT’L
INTEREST (Oct. 6, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tpp-vsrcep-america-china-battle-control-pacific-trade-14021
[https://perma.cc/54TC-GMAK]; Sanchita Basu Das, RCEP and TPP:
Comparisons and Concerns, ISEAS PERSPECTIVE, Jan. 7, 2013, at 5-6,
http://www.waseda.jp/gsaps/eaui/educational_program/PDF_2/TU_
PRASIRTSUK,%20Kitti_Reading1_RCEP%20and%20TPP%20Compar
isons%20and%20Concerns.pdf [https://perma.cc/LDV3-MZ5P].

73.

TOBIAS HARRIS ET AL., ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK:
CHINA AS A RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER? 45-46 (Daniel Bob ed., 2015);
Jack Lew, Sec’y Treasury, Remarks of Secretary Lew at the Asia Society
Northern California on the International Economic Architecture and the
Importance of Aiming High (Mar. 31, 2015) (transcript available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl10014.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q88K-XTVG]); Rebecca Liao, Out of the Bretton
Woods: How the AIIB is Different, FOREIGN AFF. (July 27, 2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2015-07-27/out-brettonwoods [https://perma.cc/S8SP-85X5]; Jane Perlez, China Creates a
World Bank of Its Own and the U.S. Balks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/business/international/chinacreates-an-asian-bank-as-the-us-stands-aloof.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/P7FW-K5XK].

74.

Jane Perlez, U.S. Opposing China’s Answer to World Bank, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Opposing China’s Answer],
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pattern of Washington’s failure was Japan, which has been a pivotal
member of the Asian Development Bank—the entity perhaps most
immediately in potential competition with the AIIB.
Although political and economic calculations do much to explain
the rush by many states in East Asia and the developed world to join
the AIIB and to reject Washington’s entreaties, the Obama
administration’s inability to claim credibly that it was defending a
robust status quo in international economic law did not help the
U.S.’s case. Beijing strongly insisted that it was not challenging status
quo norms. The PRC explained that it was offering the AIIB and
other institutional initiatives as supplements to existing entities, not
as substitutes for them or competitors to them. Chinese sources
explained that much of the lending from the new bodies would be
based on the standards established by existing institutions under rules
already in place.75 In a particularly sharp poke at the U.S.’s case,
Beijing asserted that its moves were made necessary by the failure—
largely attributable to the U.S.’s congressionally-induced inability to
move forward—to reform the IMF and the World Bank to realign
those institutions with new realities.76 Those realities principally
included the greatly increased economic importance of China, India,
and other large emerging economies, and the greatly increased need to
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinas-plan-forregional-development-bank-runs-into-us-opposition.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/7DQD-9GKE]; Jane Perlez, Stampede to Join China’s
Development Bank Stuns Even Its Founder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015)
[hereinafter Stampede to Join China’s Development Bank],
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/world/asia/china-asianinfrastructure-investment-bank.html [https://perma.cc/JF4N-4QDN].
75.

John Kerry, Sec’y State, Joint Press Availability with Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi (May 16, 2015) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/05/242497.htm
[https://perma.cc/NH7G-CPGA]) (Chinese Foreign Minister stating
AIIB “will be observing international rules” and is “ready to carry out
cooperation” with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank);
Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Address at AIIB
Inauguration Ceremony, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 16, 2016),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201601/16/content_23116718_3.htm [https://perma.cc/PB6N-HT4Q]
(stating that the AIIB would be “a truly international, rule-based and
high-standard institution that would “complement” existing
development banks); Hua Shengdun, World Bank, IMF: Will Work with
AIIB, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 17, 2015, 11:43 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/201504/17/content_20457537.htm [https://perma.cc/E8U9-9V29].

76.

China Expresses Regret at U.S. Failure to Pass IMF Reforms, REUTERS
(Dec. 12, 2014), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinausa-imf-idUSKBN0JQ0PO20141212 [https://perma.cc/3G6J-RSHH]
(quoting Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei); U.S.
Opposing China’s Answer, supra note 76.
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mobilize much greater resources if the World Bank and IMF were to
perform their functions adequately in a global economy with vast
infrastructure needs and many countries at risk for balance of
payment difficulties.77
So too, China has been able to parry U.S. critiques of China’s
international economic and legal-economic initiatives, thanks in part
to the Obama administration’s resort to China-excluding rhetoric
when it was cultivating domestic support for the TPP.78 China’s
case—and rebuttal of the U.S.’s case—also benefited from Beijing’s
ability to present the RCEP, in comparison to the TPP, as an equally
lawful and not innately rivalrous regional economic agreement that
advances (albeit somewhat modestly) widely accepted international
norms of trade liberalization and international economic integration.79
The interests and preferences of East Asian states (most of which
are members or potential members of the TPP, the RCEP, or both)
have generated complex and ambivalent stances toward the Obama
administration’s agenda on regional economic issues and their legal
aspects. Many states in the region have reacted positively. They have
endorsed parts of the U.S.’s agenda. They have pursued the TPP as a
legal framework for promoting trade, investment and economic
integration. They have welcomed the opportunity to balance their
growing economic dependence on China with more ties to the United
States. They have taken comfort in the U.S.’s signal of an economic
77.

Interview: AIIB has Opportunity to Establish Right Standards for
Multilateral Development Banks: Expert, NEW CHINA (June 30, 2015),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-06/30/c_134366519.htm
[https://perma.cc/3RWM-D8TS]; Dingding Chen, 3 Reasons the
BRICS’ New Development Bank Matters, DIPLOMAT (July 23, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/3-reasons-the-brics-new-developmentbank-matters/ [https://perma.cc/Q7KQ-F24H]; $100bn BRICS
Monetary Fund to be Operational in 30 Days, BRICS POST (July 1,
2015, 8:02 AM), http://thebricspost.com/100bn-brics-monetary-fund-tobe-operational-in-30-days/#.VhiZe_lVhBc [https://perma.cc/W3HWXRJ5].

78.

As with the TPP, the Obama administration backed off its initial
criticism in the context of the AIIB, indicating (in an echo of its shift
toward welcoming China’s potential eventual membership in the TPP)
that that the U.S. was prepared to cooperate with the AIIB, provided it
observed “best practices.” Ian Talley, Obama: We’re All for the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:56 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/04/28/obama-were-all-for-theasian-infrastructure-investment-bank/ [https://perma.cc/Y8P4-7ZH3].

79.

See, e.g., Transcript: Li Keqiang, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015, 1:46 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3a42d156-e288-11e4-aa1d00144feab7de.html [https://perma.cc/V3VT-9N9W] (providing an
interview with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, stating that RCEP and
other regional FTAs including the TPP and ASEAN-China FTA “can
all work in parallel” and calling for “full compliance with the WTO”).
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commitment to complement and reinforce its security commitment to
the region.80 Yet, these states have not wanted closer economic and
related legal ties with the United States to undermine their economic
relations with China, which have offered considerable benefits as well,
and which could be expected to grow with China’s continued
economic rise and the new opportunities offered by China’s RCEP,
AIIB, and other economic initiatives and associated legal frameworks
and institutional structures.
As the Obama years near their end, fundamental questions
remain unanswered. They include the prospects for congressional
passage of—and public reaction to—the just-completed and stillcontroversial TPP.81 Assuming Congress eventually approves the TPP
(and even if it does not), U.S. policy in the post-Obama period will
have to grapple with uncertainty about where along the spectrum
from complementarity to systemic conflict will lie the relationships
between the TPP and long-standing institutions such the IMF, the
World Bank, and the ADB, on one side, and the RCEP, and other
emerging, more Chinese-influenced entities such as the AIIB and the
NDB, as well as China’s “one belt, one road” policy (for developing
overland and maritime transportation infrastructure to link China
southward and westward all the way to Europe), on the other.

III. After Obama and under a ‘New Normal’?
As the Obama administration enters its final months, many of the
unanswered questions about the legacy of the pivot—including the
response to still-evolving security challenges in the South and East
80.

U.S. Allies, supra note 54; Michael Wesley, Trade Agreements and
Strategic Rivalry in Asia, 69 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 479, 482 (2015); see
President Obama & Prime Minister Abe, Remarks by President Obama
and Prime Minister Abe in Joint Press Conference (Apr. 28, 2015, 12:10
PM) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abejapan-joint-press-confere [https://perma.cc/V93T-ZK8E]) (Prime
Minister Abe discussing the TPP and its benefits).

81.

President Obama has stated that he remains “cautiously optimistic”
about TPP’s prospects for passage in Congress. President Barack
Obama, Remarks by the President at National Governors Association
Reception (Feb. 22, 2016) (transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/22/remarkspresident-national-governors-association-reception
[https://perma.cc/A9A7-JXE2]). This is despite statements of
opposition from leaders of the Republican majority in Congress and
from the major presidential candidates. Alexander Bolton & Vicki
Needham, GOP in no hurry to move Obama’s TPP, HILL (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/264882-gop-in-no-hurry-to-move-ontrans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/3FAG-TSVW]; see also
infra notes 83 & 84.
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China Seas, the unfinished and beleaguered quest for the TPP, and
the legal dimensions of those policy agendas—reflect the uncertainties
of long-term trends in the relative capacities and evolving preferences
of the United States, China, and other states in East Asia.
Among the factors now contributing to the uncertainty is the
possibility that the recent troubles in the Chinese economy reflect
problems that will be serious and lasting and that may have
significant political consequences. It may be that slowing growth
rates, a tumultuous stock market, a sharply fluctuating currency, and
government policy measures that have appeared to be less effective
than in the past will be more than transient or manageable problems.
If that is the case and China falls well short of the lowered
expectations of a “new normal” of 7% to 7.5% growth—or the further
lowered target of 6.5% growth to be adopted in the 13th Five Year
Plan82—or faces internal weakness and instability, then a fundamental
underpinning for the pivot and its legal component—the challenge of
an inexorably and rapidly rising China—will be called into question.
If so, and, along with it, the Obama-era policies and related legal
tactics that have responded to China’s rapid rise will need to be
reconsidered.
Another near-term event with potentially long-term consequences
is the presidential election in the United States that will bring
Obama’s successor to power in January 2017. Especially in China,
Democratic Party frontrunner Hillary Clinton is widely seen as likely
to be tougher on China than Obama was.83 Accurate or not, this
82.

Hu Angang, Embracing China’s “New Normal”: Why the Economy Is
Still on Track, FOREIGN AFF. (May-June 2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-04-20/embracingchinas-new-normal [https://perma.cc/Y8V3-F3SR]; Xi Expounds on
Guideline for 13th Five-Year Plan, XINHUANET, (Nov. 3, 2015, 9:52 PM)
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/03/c_134780297.htm
[https://perma.cc/X4HF-2D6A]; see also Mark Magnier, China’s
Economic Growth in 2015 is Slowest in 25 Years, WALL ST. J. (Jan 19,
2016).

83.

Emily Rauhala, Hillary Clinton’s Long—and Complicated—Relationship
with China, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/12/hill
ary-clintons-long-and-complicated-relationship-with-china/
[https://perma.cc/9WE5-NP9A]; Shannon Tiezzi, Imagining U.S.-China
Relations under (President) Hillary Clinton, DIPLOMAT (July 30, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/imagining-u-s-china-relations-underpresident-hillary-clinton/ [https://perma.cc/J8H2-V5W8]; Issues:
National Security, HILLARY FOR AMERICA,
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/national-security/
[https://perma.cc/8QG8-VTXC] (Hillary Clinton campaign website,
stating, “[a]s secretary of state, Hillary reasserted America’s role as a
Pacific power and called out China’s aggressive actions in the
region. As president, she’ll work with friends and allies to promote
strong rules of the road and institutions in Asia, and encourage China to
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expectation is based in part on her central role as Secretary of State
in articulating the pivot policy, including its security-related
international legal components. On the Republican side, contenders
for the nomination seem to be reprising a U.S. presidential campaign
tradition of the out-of-power party criticizing the incumbent party for
being too soft on China. The leading GOP hopefuls for 2016 seem to
be doing this in especially strong forms.84
Possible changes in policy toward China are only part of the issue
for the post-Obama prospects for the pivot and its legal sequelae.
Changes in presidents can also bring changes in U.S. views on the
importance and roles of international law. The Obama administration
placed significantly greater emphasis on international law and
presenting its foreign policy actions as conforming to international
legal norms and rules than did the Bush administration. As we have
seen, portraying the pivot in terms that emphasized or asserted the
U.S. agenda’s consistency with the international legal status quo
arguably served the U.S.’s aims and interests during the Obama
years. The next American president may, or may not, have a
significantly different perspective. The challenges he or she faces in
the East Asian region and the wider world may, or may not, be ones
for which U.S. claims to support or advance established international
legal principles and values will dovetail with U.S. interests and
administration policy.

be a responsible stakeholder—including on cyberspace, human rights,
trade, territorial disputes, and climate change—and hold it accountable
if it does not…”).
84.

See, e.g., Mark Lander, Campaign Season’s Anti-China Rhetoric Likely
to Cloud Meeting with Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/31/world/asia/campaign-seasonsanti-china-tone-is-likely-to-cloud-meeting-with-obama.html
[https://perma.cc/ZT4W-QTWQ]; David Nakamura, Anti-China
Rhetoric in Campaign Suggests Change under a New President, WASH.
POST (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/antichina-rhetoric-in-campaign-suggests-change-under-a-newpresident/2015/09/23/f6bb3066-61ff-11e5-b38e06883aacba64_story.html [https://perma.cc/KZ6B-HGBF] (explaining
that, “China again has become a target for Republicans and Democrats
alike on the presidential campaign trail. But foreign policy experts said
there is mounting evidence that this time it’s more than a rhetorical
gambit”); Transcript of Republican Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 15, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/us/politics/transcript-ofrepublican-presidential-debate.html [https://perma.cc/EL23-79K7]
(Trump describing Obama administration negotiators with China as
“political hacks who don’t know what they’re doing”; Cruz stating
“China is running over President Obama like he is a child, President
Obama is not protecting American workers and we are getting
hammered”).
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